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Abstract 
Following findings of recent literature, we analyze which are the main effects of 
the routine-bias technical change on employment. The master thesis shows evidence of 
employment polarization pattern for 16 European countries for the period 1995-2012. 
Occupations with high and low levels of earnings grow, while those with middle income 
occupations decline. This process accelerates during the recession period for all the 
studied countries (but for Italy). In a second step, we run a multinomial model to calculate 
the probabilities of working in three exclusive occupational categories: emerging high 
qualified, declining and emerging low qualified occupations. Results are computed for 
three model countries: Spain, Germany and Finland. We find that those with high 
educational level face higher probabilities on being in high paid jobs. When having low 
levels of education, men have higher chances of working on declining occupations, and 
women in low paid jobs.  
Keywords: Job polarization, technological change, emerging occupations, 
declining occupations.  
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1. Introduction 
Understanding the shifts in the structure of employment has been a central topic 
for labor economists. There are some hypotheses about the driving forces that cause 
changes in the employment composition. One may think that these changes are led by a 
changing labor force and, thus, there is a labor supply effect. Other reason behind this 
phenomenon could be the impact that institutions and regulation have on the labor market. 
However, recent literature points out at technological change as the main hypothesis. 
In the 1990s, some papers (see Autor & Katz (1999) and Autor, et al. (1998)) 
supported the idea that technological change was skill-biased (from now on SBTC: 
Skilled-bias technological change). New technical advantages raised employment for 
high skilled workers to the detriment of low skilled workers. In other words, changes in 
technology had a negative effect on low educated workers and positive effects on workers 
with medium and, mainly, high educational level. So, wages and employment in these 
last two job categories increased thanks to technological advances. 
Nevertheless, more recent findings state that employment on the upper part and 
the lowest part of the income distribution has increased, whereas mid-income jobs have 
decreased. This way, the SBTC could only explain the growth of high-skilled occupations 
(managers, professional and technicians) and fails to explain both the decline of middle 
skilled occupations (clerks, craft workers and operators and assemblers) and the increase 
of low skilled occupations (service and sales workers). Following Goos & Manning  
(2003), we refer to this phenomenon as job polarization, which can be explained by the 
Routine Bias Technological Change (RBTC) (see Autor, et al. (2003) and Autor & Price  
(2013)).  
Therefore, instead of considering the SBTC approach, we propose to follow the 
routinization hypothesis (RBTC) to analyze the impact of technology on the labor 
demand.1 When developing this theory in Autor (2013), skills were differentiated from 
tasks. Skills are defined as a worker’s endowments of capabilities for performing a set of 
tasks, whereas tasks are units of work activity that produce output. Considering their 
skills, workers choose to specialize in certain skills based on comparative advantage. So, 
by taking a task perspective rather than a skills perspective, the authors suggest that 
                                                        
1 Also known as the ALM hypothesis for their authors. 
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digitalization and automation have displaced jobs that perform mostly routine and manual 
tasks that can be easily codified, and thus, can be substituted by machines. Among these 
jobs we find clerical and production positions that, as we are going to show later, are 
identified as medium paid jobs. On the contrary, jobs performing non-routine tasks are 
complementary to technological advantages. In this set of jobs, we find skilled jobs 
(managers, professional and technicians), but we also find low skilled jobs (sales and 
services). So, the demand for high- and low-income jobs increases thanks to the 
technological progress.  
The main goal of the master thesis is to analyze the impact of technological change 
on employment and to assess how technology is driving the demand for jobs in the 
European countries. Alongside technical progress, we also want to take into account two 
other factors that are conditioning advanced economies: aging and the increasing 
participation of females in the labor force. This will allow us to study how different 
countries, with varying degrees of these two phenomena, are coping differently with 
technological change.  
We will consider a group of 16 European countries for the analysis (the EU-15 
countries plus Norway).2 Our data mainly comes from European Union Labor Force 
Survey (EU-LFS). Firstly, we are going to test whether job polarization is indeed an 
empirical phenomenon in each of the studied countries. If so, the routinization hypothesis 
would be true. It involves lots of policy implications ranging from determining what to 
do with workers in declining occupations to deciding which skills will be more demanded 
in the future. Once some descriptive evidence is shown, we run a multinomial model to 
see how the probabilities of being in emerging high qualified, declining and emerging 
low qualified occupations depend on a set of individual (worker) characteristics.  
The master thesis is divided into eight sections. Section 2 discusses the challenges 
faced by advanced European economies concerning aging, female labor participation rate 
and technology. Then, we include a section about related literature, where we comment 
their propositions and findings on the implication of technological progress in the labor 
market. Section 4 describes the data used in the master thesis. The next step is to study 
the changes in the occupational distribution across the sixteen European countries. So, in 
                                                        
2 EU-15 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom. 
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Section 5, we test the employment polarization hypothesis. After this descriptive part, we 
start the empirical analysis. Section 6 describes the way we prepare the data. Firstly, we 
select three role models (Spain, Germany and Finland) to run the model on. Secondly, we 
explain why occupations are gathered into a three category classification (emerging high 
qualified, declining and emerging low qualified occupations). In the third place, we show 
some descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis. Lastly, the multinomial 
model is explained. Section 7 presents the results and a comparison between these three 
countries. Section 8 concludes. 
 
2. Which are the challenges faced by European countries? 
As mentioned in the introduction, technological change is one of the biggest 
challenges faced by advanced economies. Still, countries nowadays have to deal with 
different topics such as aging and the increasing female labor force participation. In this 
section, that serves as motivation, we show how these three challenges have become more 
important over the years. 
Regarding aging, it is well known that European countries are already having to 
and will have to continue coping with aging and hence and increasingly older labor force. 
There are two main reasons behind the aging problem. On the one hand, a declining birth 
rate is observed in advanced countries. On the other hand, life expectancy is growing 
thanks to scientific advances in health. This way, we observe that the mean age of the 
workforce across the sixteen countries that we analyze has increased from 38.78 in 1995 
to 41.65 in 2012.3 The mean age has increased almost three years in less than 20 years. 
Furthermore, if we look at Figure 1, there is a clear upwards trend. Additionally, we find 
the steepest part of the curve in the last years of the sample, which indicates that aging 
has sped up in the last decade.   
                                                        
3 Germany is not included in the calculations for 1995, because data for this country is only available 
from 2002 on. 
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Figure 1: Evolution of the mean age of the workforce in the EU-15 countries plus Norway 
(1995-2012) 
 
The mean has been calculated taking into account the yearly weighting factor. Germany is included when 
data is available (from 2002 on). Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
Gender equality is another topic that European countries are working on. 
Although women’s incorporation into the labor market has undoubtedly increase in the 
last two decades, there’s still room from improvement when it comes to closing gender 
gaps in both employment and wages. Women’s share in the labor force has increased in 
4.55 percentage points over the sample period: while they represented 41% of the total 
workforce in 1995 in the analyzed group of countries, by 2012, female workers account 
for approximately the 46% of the labor force. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the 
women’s share of total employment. The proportion of female workers is growing, yet 
there are still big country differences. 
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Figure 2: Evolution of women’s share of total employment in the EU-15 countries plus 
Norway (1995-2012) 
 
The share has been calculated considering the yearly weighting factor. Germany included when data is 
available (from 2002 on). Source: own work based on EU-LFS data 
 
Finally, the last challenge that we are analyzing is technology. There is no doubt 
that technological progress is changing and shaping the economy, and specially, the labor 
market. There is a big debate about the net effect of technology on employment. However, 
is not clear whether the capitalization effect (the job creation caused by technological 
advances) will offset creative destruction (unemployment caused by new technical 
advances) (Arntz, et al., 2016). Nevertheless, what is true is that the share of jobs that are 
complementary to new technologies has increased over the years. As an approximation 
for technology adoption, we have calculated the high qualified employment share of total 
employment.4 This kind of jobs accounted for the 31.1% of total employment in 1995; 
                                                        
4 We define high qualified employment as jobs that require high levels of skills. In this job category we 
have included managers, professional and technicians. Later, we will explain that these jobs are the ones 
with the highest levels of education and seem to be complementary to technological change.  
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almost 20 years later, they represented 41.61%. Figure 3 displays a clear upward trend of 
high qualified occupations. 
Figure 3: Evolution of the proportion of high qualified in the EU-15 countries plus 
Norway (1995-2012) 
 
The proportion has been calculated considering the yearly weighting factor. Germany included when data 
is available (from 2002 on). Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
3. Related Literature 
Most of the recent literature agrees that there has been a shift in the labor market 
behavior related to technological change. Over the last two decades, research on labor 
markets has focused on studying the job polarization. This phenomenon is defined as the 
expansion of the share of high and low wage jobs and the decline of the share of middle 
wage jobs.  
This trend has been found in several countries. Autor, et al. (2003) is one of the 
first, and yet one of the most important papers to explore the RBTC (Routinization-Biased 
Technical Change). They follow a task-based approach to see what the consequences of 
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the adoption of computer technologies are. That is, the impact of technological change 
on jobs and occupations will depend on the set of tasks (job content) workers perform. In 
order to do so, firstly, they construct a model (the ALM model) to examine how the 
demand for tasks changes due to the introduction of cheaper technologies. The main 
prediction of the model is the decline in the demand for routine tasks. Since this kind of 
tasks are easy to codify and computerize, labor is being substituted by machines in 
performing routine tasks. On the contrary, jobs involving non-routine tasks increase 
thanks to their complementarity to new technologies. 
Autor, et al (2006) state that job polarization started in the USA in 1990. By 
sorting occupations into percentiles according to average years of schooling, they show 
that low-skill employment experimented a decline; while middle- and high- skill 
employment increased (the higher the level of education, the higher the rise in 
employment share) for the period 1980-1990. But the situation changes when the authors 
analyze the next decade. From 1990 to 2000, the employment growth showed a “U” 
shaped figure, that reflects job polarization. There was a fast increase in employment at 
the top of the distribution, a moderate rise in the bottom and a decrease in the middle. 
Nevertheless, the paper is not restricted to an occupational approach. Additionally, 
following the methodology of Autor, et al. (2003), they show the job polarization in the 
USA from a task point of view. They make a distinction in the non-routine content 
category and differentiate between cognitive and manual non-routine tasks. It is shown 
that there is a growth in employment for non-routine cognitive and non-routine manual 
tasks, usually performed by high-skill and low-skill jobs respectively, while middle-skill 
jobs performing routine tasks were declining. 
The concept of employment polarization was firstly introduced by (Goos & 
Manning (2003). In this paper, the authors give evidence about this phenomenon in the 
British labor market. By taking data from Autor, et al. (2003), they assume that 
occupations in the US and UK have the same content of tasks. Secondly, the paper 
documents that non-routine jobs can be found in the upper and lowest part of the income 
distribution. Alternatively, those jobs in the middle of the distribution are the ones 
performing routine tasks, which supports the ALM hypothesis. In the third place, it is 
shown that job polarization happened for the period 1975-1999. Therefore, low-paid 
service jobs and especially high-paid positions (such as professional and managerial) 
grew, whereas middle-income jobs experienced a decline.  
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This hypothesis has also been tested for 16 Western European economies as a 
whole. According to Goos, et al. (2010), there is evidence of employment polarization 
over the period 1993-2006. In addition, they develop a model to see which is the most 
important underlying factor of polarization. The paper concludes that the most important 
determinant of polarization, and thus, the demand for different type of occupations, is 
technological change. Goos, et al. (2014) repeat the analysis for a longer period, from 
1993 to 2010, and they draw the same conclusions. 
Acemoglu & Autor (2011) also check the employment polarization from a task 
perspective for the US and 16 European economies. In a second step, they propose a task-
based model where skills are assigned endogenously to tasks and where technical 
advances could cause the substitution of machines in tasks formerly carried out by labor. 
Following the results of Autor, et al (2003), they found that routine tasks are less 
demanded. At the same time, the model predicts that qualified workers will end up, in 
equilibrium, in jobs involving cognitive and non-routine tasks; while low qualified ones 
will work in jobs with high manual content due to their comparative advantage. 
Anghel, et al. (2014) test for employment polarization in Spain, as well as 
introduce a new feature to the analysis. The paper studies the period 1997-2012, but also 
focuses on the expansionary period (1997-2007) and the recession period (2007-2012). 
Evidence supporting employment polarization in Spain is found for the expansionary, 
recession and whole period. However, it should be noted that polarization speeds up over 
the recession. It is found that the change in the composition of the workforce is not the 
reason behind it and that sector reallocation is only significant during the expansion of 
the economy. Instead, the major driving force of the polarization is the decrease in routine 
job content and the rise in non-routine service tasks which are characteristic of jobs on 
the top and bottom of the wage distribution. Moreover, the authors perform a gender 
analysis and conclude that males have been more affected than females by job 
polarization because of their concentration in jobs that require routine content. Young 
men tend to reallocate upwards while males over 30 years old stay in routine jobs. 
Sebastian (2018) also shows evidence in favor of polarization in Spain. 
Finally, Autor & Dorn (2009) relate job polarization to aging in the US. Only 
young workers are reallocated downwards and upwards. Older workers are exiting middle 
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skill jobs to enter low wage jobs. Even old workers with college education are falling into 
low-skill nonroutine jobs. 
 
4. Data 
As we have mentioned before, the main data used in this master thesis comes from 
the European Union Labor Force Survey (EU-LFS). Nevertheless, data from Eurostat 
Database is also used to complement the former. 
The EU-LFS, which is available for 31 European countries (the EU-28 plus 
Norway, Switzerland and Iceland), consists on a household sample survey. It provides 
labor status information of the population in working age. The main goal of the survey is 
to classify people aged 15 and over into three categories: unemployed people, employed 
people (both categories form the group of active people) and inactive people.  
The Labor Force Survey is carried out by the national statistical institutes of each 
participating country and then, collected and centralized by Eurostat. Every national 
institute uses the same concepts and definitions, follows International Labour 
Organization guidelines, uses standard classifications (for example: ISCO for occupation, 
NACE for industries or ISCED for educational level) and reports the same individual 
characteristics of the subjects so that the results are comparable between countries. 
EU-LFS data has been collected from 1983 onwards; however, certain 
information is only available for more recent years. That is why we are analyzing the 
period 1995-2012.5 Even though more recent surveys have been conducted (up to 2018), 
the access to microdata is restrictive.6. Thus, we are restricted to use the data that we have, 
annual data up to the year 2012. We leave the period 2012 to 2018 for further research. 
                                                        
5 But for Germany, Finland Norway and Sweden. The period is restricted to 2002-2012 for Germany 
because data is only available starting the year 2002. For the three Nordic countries there’s a lack of 
occupational data in 1995 and 1996, so the analysis has been made from 1997 to 2012. 
6 To obtain the full sample of microdata an application is needed from a research organization. Firstly, the 
organization has to be recognized as a research entity. Secondly, the organization has to apply for the 
microdata. Both phases of the process take months, which is why we are restricted in our period of 
analysis. 
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As regards to the country sample, we have chosen the EU-15 countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom) and also Norway, due to its 
proximity to the rest of the Nordic countries. This way, we have a pool of sixteen 
countries. 
The EU-LFS includes data related to employment status, weekly hours worked, 
age, gender, marital status, nationality, economic activity (one-digit industry level), 
occupation (three-digit occupational level), educational level, type of contract and tenure, 
among others. For this piece of research, we are only using the data on employment status, 
occupational data and some demographic variables, including age, gender, nationality 
and educational level; because those are the ones we consider to be the most relevant 
when studying the challenges, we have described and also the ones that best explain in 
which occupational category a worker falls. 
Since we want to observe the shifts on employment, we are working with subjects 
that are employed during the reference week. Additionally, we have had to work on the 
occupational-level data because it is not comparable for the whole period. The EU-LFS 
use the ISCO-88 occupational classification until 2010. From that year on, occupations 
are reported according to the ISCO-08 categorization. Nonetheless, both classifications 
can be comparable by using the crosswalks at three-digit level provided by Eurostat. So, 
we have re-classified all the jobs according to the ISCO-88 occupational classification. 
In addition to this, we also use data on monthly earnings of 2002, taken from the 
Eurostat database. They are reported for each country and occupation (at one-digit level).7 
We use this data in the following section, where we test for the job polarization 
hypothesis, in order to classify occupation according to income. We also take the old-
age-dependency ratio data and employment information in high-tech sectors from the 
Eurostat Database. The former consists on the ratio between the number of persons aged 
65 and over (age when they are generally retired) and the number of persons aged between 
15 and 64. We use this statistic later to see which are the countries that will suffer most 
from the aging problem. 
                                                        
7 Data for group 0 (armed forces) and group 6 (skilled agricultural and fishery workers) are not available. 
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5. Changes in the occupational distribution. Employment 
polarization. 
In this section, we describe the impact of technological changes on employment 
over the 1995-2012 period for the EU-15 countries and Norway. As mentioned in the 
introduction and in the related literature part, there has been a shift on the effects of 
technical progress on the composition of employment. Previous technological changes 
were proven to be skill-biased Acemoglu & Autor (2011). In other words, there was a 
positive relationship between skills, which can be measured by earnings or education, and 
employment growth. In this case, high-skilled occupations (with high level of education 
and wages) experienced a rise in both employment share and wages. 
However, new advances and cheaper technologies cause the Routine Biased 
Technical Change (RBTC) Autor, et al. (2003), which is the main driving force of job 
polarization, as seen in the previous section. This phenomenon is characterized by a surge 
in the share of high-skill and high-wage occupations, as well as in low-skill and low-wage 
occupations; at the expense of a decline in middle-skill and middle-wage jobs. 
Many papers have tested this hypothesis for a specific country (for example: Goos 
& Manning (2003) for the UK or Anghel, et al. (2014)for Spain) or at an aggregate level 
in the case of Europe Goos, et al. (2010). In this master thesis, we are checking the 
employment polarization for a total of 16 countries.  
Since we are proposing an occupational approach, our aim is to look at changes 
in employment shares of the different occupational groups. We take information from the 
EU-LFS for each country and from 1995 to 2012. In order to measure the skills of jobs, 
we rank the occupations by 2002 monthly mean wages. It is important to measure skills 
(in this case wages) at the beginning of the period (or at least no at the end) because we 
want to study differences with respect to the year 1995. This time, skills are fixed to the 
year 2002. Notice that reported wages are different for each country, so occupations do 
not follow the same classification in each of them.  
Despite the fact that we have access to job classification at three-digit (ISCO-88) 
occupational level, wage information is only available at one-digit level (ISCO-88) 
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classification, which forces us to restrict our analysis to less than 10 categories.8 
Moreover, the Eurostat database does not report income related data for armed forces and 
skilled agricultural and fishery workers. Nevertheless, the weight on total employment of 
these two groups in rather small. Both groups represent less than 8% of total employment 
on aggregate level (the 16 countries minus Germany) in 1995. 
Following Anghel, et al. (2014), we display the changes in the share of 
employment for six occupational groups. The first three groups on the ISCO-88 
classification (managers, professional and technicians) have been merged into a unique 
category. We proceed like this because workers in this type of jobs are the ones with the 
highest level of income and educational level. The rest are: clerks; service workers and 
shop and market sales workers; craft and related trades workers; plant and machine 
operators and assemblers; and elementary occupations. 
In an effort to disentangle the analysis, results are displayed for two periods as 
Anghel, et al. (2014). One for the expansionary period that goes from 1995 to 2007. And 
the other one for the whole period including the recession (1995-2012). This let us to 
know whether employment polarization is present in both periods and also whether the 
process accelerates or decelerates over the whole period. In addition, it allows us to 
observe if the change in the employment composition is structural, in spite of the 
recession.  
In the first place, the shift in the employment structure is shown for a sole country. 
Figure 4 analyzes the case of France. We have chosen this country because employment 
polarization is very noticeable. Nevertheless, we analyze the case for the remaining 15 
countries later on. The plot displays the change in employment share (in percentage 
points) by occupations, which are ranked according average wages of 2002 from lowest 
to highest.  
                                                        
8 Getting access to EU-SES (European Union Structure of Earnings Survey) would mean that we could 
have wages from 1995 at a three-digit level. However, the procedure to obtain this dataset is the same as 
the EU-LFS LFS and was therefore beyond the timeline of this master thesis. 
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Figure 4: Change in employment share by occupational group in percentage points 
 
The data include all employed people on working age during the reference week. Skilled agricultural and 
fishery workers and workers in armed forces are not included. Occupations follow the ISCO-88 one-digit 
level classification and are ranked by 2002 mean wages. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data and 
Eurostat Database. 
 
Let us start by analyzing the expansionary period (1995-2007). Here we can see 
an obvious pattern of job polarization. Over the 12-year period, occupations in the upper 
part of the wage distribution (managers, professional and technicians) expanded in 5 
percentage points (or pp). On the opposite side of the income distribution, we find that 
service and sales occupations increased in less than 1 pp, but the expansion of elementary 
occupations surpassed the 2.5 pp. The rest of the occupations, that are characterized by 
middle-wages, declined. All of the three occupational groups (clerks, operators and 
assemblers and craft and trade workers) experienced a decrease close to 2.5 pp. Thus, it 
is proven that lowest- and highest-paying occupations underwent a rise in the employment 
share. 
If we focus on the entire period, including the recession, the evolution of 
employment remains the same. Top paid occupations’ expansion reached 10 pp. This 
means that in the five-year period (2007-2012) occupations including managers, 
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professional and technicians grew the same as in the economic expansion. As regards to 
elementary occupations, the growth was the same as in the restricted period. However, 
occupations related to service and sales experienced a big boom reaching an increase of 
5 pp. Additionally, mid-skill jobs suffered a greater decline over the whole period. In the 
case of clerks, the employment proportion decreased in almost 5 pp. As for operators and 
assemblers, the drop (4.5 pp) also doubled in the recession years with respect to the 1997-
2007 period. Finally, craft and trade workers faced the biggest fall surpassing 5 pp.  
With regards to France, the employment polarization happened for both the 
expansionary and recession periods. These results are in line with those reported in the 
recent literature; the share of jobs in low- and especially high-skill occupations associated 
with nonroutine (service and abstract, respectively) task has grown, whereas mid-skill 
jobs, mostly performing routine tasks, have declined. We can even confirm that this 
process has deepened in the recession years. This evidence gives us a sense that the labor 
market in France has experienced a structural change. 
Now that we have presented the case for a specific country, which has served as 
an example, we show the results for the whole pool of 16 countries. Figure 5 displays the 
change in employment level from 1995 to 2012.9 As in the previous case, results are 
depicted for two periods (up to the recession and including the recession).  
                                                        
9 2002-2012 for Germany; and 1997-2012 for Finland, Norway and Sweden. 
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Figure 5: Change in employment share by occupational group in percentage points 
 
The data include all employed people on working age during the reference week. Occupations follow the 
ISCO-88 one-digit level classification and are ranked by 2002 mean wages. Groups are classified as 
follows: group 1: managers, professionals and technicians; group 4: clerks; group 5: service and sales 
workers; group 7: craft and related trades workers; group 8: operators and assemblers; group 9: 
elementary occupations. Skilled agricultural and fishery workers (group 6) and workers in armed forces 
(group 0) are not included. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data and Eurostat Database. 
 
At a glance, we can observe that each country follows the “U” shape pattern that 
is characteristic of job polarization. However, we proceed case by case to see whether 
there are differences across countries.  
On the one hand, we have countries where the phenomenon is crystal clear. We 
are referring to Belgium, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK. In this set of economies, the 
share of occupations related to managers, professionals and technicians experienced the 
biggest increase; followed by the two-low paid service occupations. For Netherlands, the 
most pronounced rise was for the service and sales workers from 1995 to 2012. The 
employment share of middle-skill occupations falls considerably. Moreover, it is 
observed that polarization has accelerated during the recession years. 
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On the other hand, there is a handful of countries (Austria, Denmark, Finland and 
Ireland) where elementary occupation does not show a big increase, and sometimes an 
insignificant decrease. Nevertheless, the share of low and high paying jobs is growing, 
while middle ones decrease. As for the previously mentioned countries, changes are more 
pronounced when including recession years. 
There are also countries like Spain, Norway and Luxembourg in which the decline 
of elementary occupations, those in the lowest part of the income distribution, is more 
noticeable. This could be due to the composition of the elementary occupations group, 
which is a mixture of service and primary sector jobs. The decrease in the share of the 
latter could have offset the rise in the former. Still, employment polarization is obvious 
if we aggregate both low-wage occupations and it seems that it has sped up during the 
recession period. With regards to Luxembourg and Norway, the biggest increase is 
detected in the best paid jobs (particularly in Luxembourg with a rise of 20 pp; in Norway 
there is an expansion of 10 pp). In Spain, service and sales occupations experience the 
highest jump with an increase of 10 pp. It should also be noted that the share of clerks 
does not decline.  
Finally, we want to make some comments for a few specific countries. For Greece, 
the job polarization process is a fact, but there is little increase in the share of jobs in top 
paid occupations and the only middle paid occupation declining (the rest remain with a 
constant share) is craft and trade workers. In the case of Portugal, the “U” shaped curve 
is seen when considering the whole period. Italy is the only country where polarization is 
not fully seen; it looks like the crisis period has stopped it. Lastly, Germany is the country 
with the least pronounced “U” shaped curve, with changes under 5 pp. Recession appears 
to deepen the polarization process. 
To sum up, the demand in European countries is shifting to the extremes of the 
income distribution, being low paid service jobs and high paid positions the ones that 
have grown more from 1995 to 2012. Moreover, the trend is more pronounced when 
taking into account the recession period. 
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6. Empirical specification 
In the previous section, the master thesis displays descriptive evidence that 
supports the job polarization hypothesis caused by the technological change, which has 
shown that those workers in emerging occupations (Managers, professionals, technicians, 
service and sales workers and elementary occupations) have benefitted from technical 
advances, whereas those workers in declining occupations (clerks, operators and 
assemblers and craft and related trade workers) have ended up losing out. Once it is shown 
which are the real winners and losers of the change in the employment structure across 
16 European countries, we proceed to start the empirical analysis. 
The aim of this section is to establish a relationship between the changes in the 
demand for labor caused by technical advances, and the individual characteristics of 
workers, such as age, gender and educational level. Therefore, we propose to estimate a 
multinomial logit model to calculate the probabilities of being on each of the occupational 
categories depending on age, gender and education. However, since we want to examine 
the evolution of the probabilities over the period 1995-2012 for different countries, we 
propose to estimate the model for each year and each country.  
Repeating this process for 16 countries would produce a huge output, difficult to 
analyze. That is why we restrict the exercise for a limited number of countries. Based on 
evidence related to aging, female participation of the labor force and technology we 
choose three countries: Spain, Germany and Finland. These results will not only give us 
information on the population groups in the growing and declining occupations, but also 
differences across countries. 
6.1. Choosing the country role models 
As noted above, we want to restrict our analysis a bit more in order to simplify the 
outcomes. One way to interpret easily the results is to take three countries as role models: 
Spain, Germany and Finland. The choice has been made according to country specific 
characteristics about gender, aging and technology. 
First of all, we are going to represent the aging phenomenon across European 
countries. We initially considered showing the mean age of the labor force for each 
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country and selecting one country among the oldest ones, other among the youngest and 
another on an intermediate level. However, the mean age of the labor force does not 
completely define this issue. Instead, we use the old age dependency ratio provided by 
Eurostat. The indicator is the ratio between the number of persons aged 65 and over and 
the number of persons whose age ranged from 15 to 64 years. It is a more reliable statistic 
than the mean age of the workforce, since it also includes inactive people (who generally 
are older than 65). 
Figure 6: Evolution of the old-age-dependency ratio for the EU-15 countries and Norway 
 
The mean for this group of countries is also included as “EU15+Norway”. This indicator is the ratio 
between the number of persons aged 65 and over (age when they are generally economically inactive) and 
the number of persons aged between 15 and 64. The ratio is expressed in per 100 persons of working age 
(15-64). The dashed vertical line denotes the year 2018; from this year on the projected old-age-
dependency ratio is represented. Source: own work based on Eurostat Database. 
 
Figure 6 shows the evolution of the statistic for the selected group of countries. 
As we can see in the graph, Spain is one of the countries with the worst projections. 
Although its figures are below the European mean nowadays, the dependency ratio 
skyrockets from 2030 on. Thus, we chose Spain as a country that will have to deal with a 
serious aging problem. Then, Germany is selected as country that will stay around the 
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mean in the long term. Lastly, we have Finland that will have a ratio lower than the mean, 
so it is picked as a country whose aging problem is not that big. Notice that Germany and 
Finland hold high numbers during the last decade. Nevertheless, the upward trend softens 
in the long-term projections, maybe due to the parental leaves, policies to boost birthrates 
and immigration. 
In the second place we look at female labor force participation issues. One way to 
approximate it examination the women’s share of total employment. Figure 7 shows us 
the proportion of the workforce that are female for the year 2012. As we did before, we 
are taking one leading country, one that is close to the mean and another that is in the 
bottom of the ranking. In this case, the leader is Finland, where the 48.7% of workers are 
women. On the opposite side, we have Spain. The proportion of women (45.4%) is below 
but close to the European mean. Then, we have countries like Germany which are on the 
European mean, with women representing the 45.9% of workers in the labor market. It is 
ahead of Spain but far away from Finland.  
Figure 7: Women’s share of total employment in 2012 for the EU-15 countries plus 
Norway 
 
The mean this group of countries is also included as “EU15+Norway”. Source: own work based on EU-
LFS Data. 
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Lastly, we focus on technological change. We propose to approach the 
technological penetration in each of the economies by measuring high-tech employment. 
As we can see in figure 8, there are noticeable differences between European economies. 
Again, three countries are chosen: one leading country, one that is close to the mean and 
one that is in the bottom of the ranking. Finland holds the second position in this 
classification, where the 5.8% of the jobs are considered high-tech. Germany is around 
the middle of the ranking; the share of total employment is close 4.3%. Spain is the chosen 
economy to represent those with low level high-tech employment (with 3.7%). However, 
it is above the European mean because countries like Portugal and Greece are far behind 
the rest with levels close to 2%. 
Figure 8: High-tech employment share of total employment in 2012 for the EU-15 
countries plus Norway 
 
It is measured by computing the Employment in technology and knowledge-intensive sectors at the national 
level. Source: own work based on Eurostat Database. 
 
In summary, we select Spain as a country with an important aging problem, with 
room for improvement in regards to women’s participation in the labor force and with 
low levels of technology implementation when compared to the leaders. Germany is the 
25 
 
role model for countries in the middle. In these three topics, Germany sits around the 
mean. And Finland is taken as a leader in aging, gender and technology. 
6.2. Creating a broader occupational classification 
The dependent variable considered for the analysis is the occupational 
classification that, following the previous section, is divided into six exclusive categories: 
elementary occupations; service and sales; clerks; operators and assemblers; craft and 
related trades works; and managers, professionals and technicians. This variable is a 
nominal one which means that categories cannot be ordered. Therefore, a multinomial 
model is considered.  
However, we want the occupational classification to be more extensive. On the 
one hand, we will relate this broader classification to the “winners” and “losers” 
previously mentioned, which is what mostly interests us when analyzing the impact of 
technological change. However, we also make a distinction among those occupations that 
emerge, separating those high-paid emerging occupations from the low-paying ones. On 
the other hand, a multinomial logit with three categories instead of six simplifies the 
interpretation of the results. 
Thus, the occupations gathered into three groups based on evidence and literature. 
In the first place, we include managers, professionals and technicians into a category 
called emerging high qualified occupations. They are emerging because their 
employment share has increased over the last two decades in European Western countries, 
as verified in Section 5. We identify them as high qualified occupations because 
Acemoglu & Autor  (2011) determine that workers in these jobs mostly perform abstract 
nonroutine cognitive tasks. 
In the second place, we group together those occupations that lose employment 
share over the period 1995-2012. According to the results of the previous part, declining 
occupations are not the same for the 16 countries. Nevertheless, we observe, in general, 
that operators and assemblers, craft and trade workers and clerks are the ones suffering 
from the effects of technological change on aggregate level. These three middle-skill 
occupations are introduced into a group called declining occupations. Another similarity 
between this type of jobs, enabling us to classify them together, is that workers are 
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specialized in routine tasks (but there’s a distinction between clerks and those working in 
manufacturing: the former are used to carry out routine cognitive tasks while the latter 
perform routine manual ones) Acemoglu & Autor  (2011). 
Lastly, service and sales workers and elementary occupations as well are arranged 
into emerging low qualified occupations. These typically low paid jobs are 
characterized by low educational level requirements and a high increase in employment 
share. Additionally, trying to identify occupations by tasks, these jobs demand, generally, 
non-routine manual and service tasks Acemoglu & Autor (2011). 
The relationship between occupations and tasks is shown in Table 5a in Acemoglu 
& Autor (2011). They create five variables (non-routine cognitive analytic, non-routine 
cognitive interpersonal, routine cognitive, routine manual and non-routine manual) that 
reflect the task measure for different occupations. These have been constructed using 
O*NET occupational classification scheme and have zero mean and standard deviation 
one. Managers, professionals and technicians have the highest score in non-routine 
cognitive tasks (the abstract ones) and non-routine interpersonal; service and production 
occupations have the lowest. The table shows that the routine tasks are highest in clerical 
and production jobs.10 Non-routine manual tasks are the highest for production and 
service occupations. 
Therefore, we have a categorical dependent variable with three different 
outcomes: being in emerging high qualified occupations, emerging low qualified 
occupations and declining occupations. 
6.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 contains the summary statistics displayed according to the three 
occupational categories (emerging high qualified, declining and emerging low qualified). 
The statistics have been calculated taking mean over the period 1995-2012 across the 16 
European countries; individual weights for each observation have been used. 
All of the variables are dummy variables (either take value 1 if the subject has that 
characteristic or 0 if not) and, consequently, the mean represents the proportion of 
                                                        
10 Notice that Acemoglu & Autor (2011) include in just one category clerical and service occupations.  
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individual with that characteristic. The first two variables are related to gender. Regarding 
age, one individual is considered young if s/he is aged from 16 to 30; in his middle age if 
aged between 31 and 45; and old if 46 or older. With respect to education, if an individual 
has lower educational level than lower secondary, it is considered that s/he is low 
educated (digit 0,1 and 2 according to ISCED 2011 classification). When the highest 
educational attainment level is upper secondary, the subject has medium educational level 
(digit 3 and 4 according to ISCED 2011 classification). If the person has achieved tertiary 
education, s/he is treated as high educated. 
Table 1: Summary statistics of explanatory variables 
Emerging High Qualified Occupation 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Man 0.5556263 0.4968961 
Woman 0.4443737 0.4968961 
Young 0.1661194 0.3721878 
Middle aged 0.4366627 0.4959722 
Old 0.3972179 0.4893219 
Low educational level 0.1087977 0.3113853 
Medium educational level 0.3506093 0.4771608 
High educational level 0.5405929 0.4983495 
Declining Occupations  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Man 0.6746366 0.4685105 
Woman 0.3253634 0.4685105 
Young 0.2411426 0.4277767 
Middle aged 0.4099113 0.4918171 
Old 0.3489461 0.4766369 
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Low educational level 0.3903251 0.4878232 
Medium educational level 0.5074676 0.4999443 
High educational level 0.1022074 0.3029208 
Emerging Low Qualified Occupation 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. 
Man 0.3901057 0.4877738 
Woman 0.6098943 0.4877738 
Young 0.2909668 0.4542083 
Middle aged 0.3687071 0.4824544 
Old 0.3403261 0.4738189 
Low educational level 0.4731611 0.4992792 
Medium educational level 0.4477269 0.4972601 
High educational level 0.079112 0.2699135 
 
Among workers in high qualified occupations, we find that men represent 55% of 
the total. There is a low presence of young people in top paid jobs. About 83% of 
individuals in this category are older than 30 years. More than half (55%) have tertiary 
education, which reflect that managers, professionals and technicians are high skilled 
workers. Declining occupations are more segregated. Men represent almost 70% of 
workers in these jobs, which are mainly production ones (except clerks). The majority of 
them have a medium level of education (51%), followed by low educational level (40%), 
and are middle aged (41%) or old (35%). However, there are more young workers in these 
occupations than in emerging high qualified ones. With respect to emerging low qualified 
occupations, we can confirm that they are mostly occupied by women. We have workers 
from all the ages in low-paid jobs (29% the young; 37% the middle aged; 34% the old) 
and the majority of them are either low educated or have medium educational level (47% 
and 45% respectively). 
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6.4. The model 
As mentioned before, the proposed model is a multinomial logit, where the 
dependent variable occupational category is regressed on a set of explanatory variables. 
The dependent variable contains three options that are mutually exclusive: emerging high 
qualified occupations, declining occupations and emerging low qualified occupations. 
The independent variables entering the regression are dummy variables. The model can 
be represented as: 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠/01∗= 𝛽5 + 𝛽7𝑤𝑜𝑚𝑎𝑛/01 + 𝛽:𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑔/01 + 𝛽<𝑜𝑙𝑑/01 + 𝛽>𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/01+ 𝛽@ℎ𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛/01 + 𝛽B𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡/01 + 𝜖/01  
where 𝑂𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑝𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙	𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝𝑠/01∗ is the latent variable associated to the true 
categorical dependent variable. The base subject is a middle-aged man with medium level 
of education and who is native. The subscript i denotes each individual observation; j 
stands for country; and t refers to years. 
Models for nominal outcomes can be thought as binary logits that are estimated 
simultaneously for all the possible comparison among the outcome categories (Long, 
1997). The estimation method is maximum likelihood. 
Concerning the interpretation, we are not going through neither the estimated 
parameters nor the marginal effects. On the one hand, because even with this simple 
model (with three outcomes and five explanatory variables), there are 12 different 
parameters or marginals to interpret. On the other hand, the value of the marginal effect, 
depends not only on the value of the estimated coefficients, but also on the value of the 
independent variables. Therefore, the sign of the estimated parameters may not be the 
same as the marginal effects making it difficult to interpret them. For these reasons, we 
are computing the predicted probabilities on being on each of the categories depending 
on different individual characteristics, instead. This makes the comparison across 
different groups a lot easier. Notice that we are repeating this process for each year (from 
1995 to 2012), so we observe the evolution of the predicted probabilities. 
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7. Results 
In this section, results from the multinomial estimations are presented. We show 
the estimated probabilities on being on each of the three occupational categories for six 
population groups and for each role model country. The population groups are designed 
according to individual characteristics and are the following ones: old and young people 
as a way to analyze the aging phenomenon; men and women, to look at gender 
differences; and high educated and low educated people.11 
We expect to find higher differences between old and young in those countries 
where aging is a more noticeable (in our case, Spain). We also anticipate to find more 
possibilities of being in top paid occupations in countries in which advanced technologies 
are implemented (the case for Finland). Finally, we suspect that differences between men 
and women arise in countries with lower women’s share in the workforce.  
The way we proceed is as follows: in the first place, we look whether polarization 
is visible in Spain by looking at probabilities on being on each of the occupational 
categories; secondly, we study the situation for the low and high educated workers; in the 
third place, we compare the situation of the young and old; lastly, we look at differences 
between men and women in each of the categories. Then, we repeat this exercise for 
Germany and Finland, but including a comparison with respect to Spain. 
7.1. Spain 
Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 plot the evolution of probabilities in Spain for each 
population group. Firstly, we can confirm a pattern of employment polarization in the 
estimated probabilities. Regarding the emerging high qualified occupations, they tend to 
increase or maintain over the 1995-2012 period. The rise of the emerging low qualified 
occupations is much more obvious. Nevertheless, the increase occurs on the recession 
period. For previous years, the probabilities remain at levels similar to the ones in 1995. 
On the contrary, probabilities on working in declining occupations decrease. As it 
happened with low skill jobs, the fall in the probabilities takes place from the year 2007. 
This gives us evidence on employment polarization, which accelerated on the recession 
                                                        
11 Medium aged and middle-education groups are included in the model, but are excluded out of the 
interpretation. 
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years. The results fit perfectly with what is seen in the changes in the occupational 
distribution (Section 5). 
Next, we look at differences between workers with high and low levels of 
education. Individuals with tertiary education have higher probabilities of being in 
emerging high qualified occupations, whereas people with educational below lower 
secondary face higher probabilities of being in emerging low qualified occupations. 
When comparing young and old, we see a similar evolution between these two groups if 
both are equally educated. However, young are more exposed (deal with higher 
probabilities) to low-paid emerging jobs, while the possibilities on being in high- and 
medium-income jobs are greater for the old. 
Let us analyze the situation case by case. With regards to young people with 
tertiary education, they show a high probability of being in emerging high qualified 
occupations (around 60%). Therefore, there is a match between jobs and qualifications. 
For both men and women, the probabilities have increased over the period. However, they 
were higher for the latter group until the year 2010. From this year on, men have higher 
probabilities of working in this type of occupations than females. At the beginning of the 
period, the probability of being in declining occupations (close to 45%) were close to the 
ones of emerging high qualified jobs in the case of men. The situation changes for recent 
years; the probability has fallen from 45% to 30%. On the other hand, chances of being 
in emerging low qualified occupations hasn’t changed over the years (around 10%). The 
situation is rather different for women. In 1995, women faced a low probability (only 
slightly above 20%) of being in declining and emerging low qualified occupations; but 
both job categories don’t experience the same evolution: probabilities for decreasing 
medium income jobs decline, while the ones for the emerging low paid jobs grows, 
reaching 30%. 
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Figure 9:Evolution of estimated probabilities for young workers with high educational 
level in Spain (1995-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
In the case of high educated workers aged 45 years or more the situation is a bit 
different. As it happened with the young, this group face the highest chances (around 
80%) of being in emerging high qualified occupations for both male and females. 
However, the evolution is downwards (70% at the end of the period). For women, the 
probability of working in declining (opposite to young women) and emerging low 
qualified occupations has increased, reaching the 15%. In the case of men, the likelihood 
of being in declining occupations is steady (20%), unlike young high educated workers 
that faced greater probabilities. The same happens when referring to emerging low 
qualified occupations. 
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Figure 10: Evolution of estimated probabilities case for old workers with high 
educational level in Spain (1995-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
For young individuals with low educational level, the likelihood of being in 
emerging high qualified occupations has increased, but stays lower than 10% in 2012. 
Women face higher probability of being in emerging low qualified occupations. The 
tendency over the analyzed period is upwards, reaching probabilities close to 80% in the 
end of the period. On the other hand, the likelihood of working in declining jobs stays 
below 30% and decreases over the years. For men, the probability of being in declining 
occupations is higher. In spite of the increase during the beginning of the period, it has 
fallen from 2008 on, up to the point of being below the probability of being in emerging 
low qualified occupations. Chances of being in this last category have considerably grown 
from the start of the recession.  
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Figure 11: Evolution of estimated probabilities for young workers with low educational 
level in Spain (1995-2012) 
 
 The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
Lastly, we look at low educated old workers. The situation is similar to the young 
individuals with low educational level. Still, they have higher probabilities of being in 
higher paid jobs (declining and emerging high qualified occupations). Old women face 
higher chances of working in emerging low qualified occupations; the evolution is 
upwards, going from 50% to 70%. When talking about declining occupations, the 
likelihood decreases, reaching the 20%. Men find themselves in declining occupations, 
even though the possibilities have decreased (no that much as young worker with the 
same educational attainment). They also see how the probability of entering low paid jobs 
increase, especially in the last 5 years of the period. Chances of working in top 
occupations is low and declines over the years for old men and women; however, 
probabilities are higher than for the young. 
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Figure 12: Evolution of estimated probabilities for old workers with low educational level 
in Spain (1995-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
To sum up, high educated people stay in emerging high qualified occupations. 
Having tertiary education guarantees a high-skilled job for older workers (with 
probability close to 0.8), but the situation is rather different for the young. When highly 
educated, young workers are more exposed to declining and emerging low qualified 
occupations. This evidence shows a mismatch between jobs and qualifications, especially 
for women who face a relatively high probability (30%) of working in low qualified 
occupations. Therefore, being old, that is associated with tenure, is significant to explain 
differences in probabilities. For workers with low educational level, the situation is 
similar between old and young. They exit emerging high qualified and declining 
occupations to enter emerging low qualified occupations. 
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7.2. Germany 
By looking at Figures 13, 14, 15 and 16, we can observe the results for Germany. 
The first conclusion that we draw is that the employment polarization is not as visible in 
Germany. On an aggregate level, the likelihood increases for emerging high qualified and 
emerging low qualified occupations and, consequently, it decreases for declining 
occupations. Even so the changes are smooth and less pronounced than in Spain; but it is 
no surprise. Results of section 5 pointed out that employment polarization in Germany 
was happening but at a slower pace, maybe because of the industrial composition of 
Germany. The biggest variations occurred in the recession period (2007-2012), as in 
Spain. 
Differences between workers with high and low education are really pronounced. 
The former work in emerging high qualified occupations with an 80% probability while 
the latter work, mainly, in the other two occupational groups depending on gender. If we 
look at population groups conditional on age, we observe that there are no differences 
between the old and young. This is a major finding that is telling us that working on one 
occupational group or another depends exclusively on education when comparing 
workers of the same gender. Unlike in Spain, where there was sort of a “premium” for 
being old; young and old face the same probabilities in Germany. 
Once a general analysis has been made, we focus on group differences with 
respect to Spain. Workers with tertiary education and aged from 16 to 30 years have 
probabilities close to 85% of working in emerging high qualified occupations. If we want 
to examine the evolution over the period, we confirm that the trend is upwards. Chances 
on being in low income and medium income remain below 10% in the case of females. 
For men, the likelihood of being in declining occupations drops below the 20%; while 
probabilities of working in emerging low qualified occupations do not vary and stay close 
the 5%. 
Young high educated individuals in Germany exhibit higher probabilities of being 
in emerging high qualified occupations than their Spanish counterparts. Moreover, 
chances of entering low qualified and declining jobs are higher for the Spanish young 
workers. Therefore, we can perceive a mismatch between education and occupations (in 
Spain). 
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Figure 13: Evolution of estimated probabilities for young workers with high educational 
level in Germany (2002-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
Results are the same as for the young qualified workers: old workers see how the 
probability of being in high qualified occupations increase from 1995 to 2012; but on the 
contrary, the evolution was downwards in the case of Spain. In Germany workers in this 
group exit declining occupations; at the same time, probabilities remain almost constant 
for Spain. Regarding emerging low qualified occupations, the situation does not vary in 
Germany. In Spain it does for women (the probabilities increase). Results are much more 
similar between old high educated workers than young workers with tertiary education 
between these two countries.  
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Figure 14: Evolution of estimated probabilities case for old workers with high 
educational level in Germany (2002-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
For low educated young women, chances on being in emerging low qualified job 
are the highest (around 55%) whereas in declining occupations remain at the same level 
as in the beginning of the period (30%). Men face higher probability of working in 
declining occupations, but it decreases as time goes by. The likelihood for emerging low 
qualified occupations raises and stays close to 30% in 2012. With respect to emerging 
high qualified occupations, the probability stays below 20% and decreases both for men 
and women.  
When compared to Spain, we conclude that: (i) the growth of emerging low 
qualified occupations is lower; (ii) declining occupations do not suffer as much as in 
Spain, maybe due to the strong German industrial fabric; and (iii) probabilities of being 
in top paid occupations are low but higher than for the Spanish counterparts. 
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Figure 15: Evolution of estimated probabilities for young workers with low educational 
level in Germany (2002-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
The evolution for low educated workers aged 45 or more is quite the same as for 
the young ones. Nevertheless, the declines and increases are a little bit more pronounced. 
As it happened with the low qualified young, the evolution is quite similar in both 
countries. However, the growth in low skill jobs is more moderate and the fall in declining 
jobs is lower in Germany. Once more, this groups find a higher decline of being in top 
paid occupations in Spain.  
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Figure 16: Evolution of estimated probabilities case for old workers with low educational 
level in Germany (2002-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
7.3. Finland  
Figures 17, 18, 19 and 20 depict the picture for Finland. At a glance, we can 
confirm that the situation is closer to Germany than to Spain. The best paid occupations 
seem to maintain their probability over the period on aggregate level. The same can be 
said about declining occupations, for which some groups the likelihood increases. Low 
paid occupations are growing from 1995 to 2012. This resembles to what it is observed 
in Figure 5. Jobs experiencing major changes were emerging low qualified occupations 
and the fall in the declining occupations wasn’t that high. Notice that we are not seeing 
the whole picture since we are not including the results for middle aged workers. Still, 
employment polarization is perceived. 
If we focus on education, it is clear that it really is a determining factor in Finland. 
Those with tertiary education are employed in emerging high qualified occupations. 
Chances of working in the other two job categories are low. On the other hand, individuals 
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with low educational level are mainly concentrated in declining and emerging low 
qualified occupations depending on gender. Regarding age, there are no differences 
between old and young when high educational level is attained; age is not significant to 
explain differences in probabilities. The situation is close to the one in Germany and 
different from the one in Spain. The situation differs a bit when treating low educated 
workers. 
Regarding young high educated workers, they are more likely to work in emerging 
high qualified occupations for both men and women. The probability is higher for the 
former (around 80% and 70%, respectively). Chances of working in declining and 
emerging low qualified jobs are low and stay below the 20%. Men are more exposed to 
declining jobs and women to low paid ones. Mid income jobs decline over the period 
while low income positions increase for women. This group faces a higher probability of 
being in emerging high qualified occupations than the Spanish. Chances of being in the 
rest of the occupational categories are higher for the Spanish counterparts. 
Figure 17: Evolution of estimated probabilities for young workers with high 
educational level in Finland (1997-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
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The evolution is quite similar for old worker with tertiary education. The only 
difference we can stand out is that there is a decrease in the probability of being in 
emerging high qualified occupations (still, the probability is high and close to 80%) and 
that the increase in emerging low qualified occupations is not that high for women. 
Compared to Spain, we confirm that the evolution is quite similar. 
Figure 18: Evolution of estimated probabilities for old workers with high educational 
level in Finland (1997-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
Now we look at the state of low skilled aged between 16 and 30 years. The 
likelihood of working in declining occupations are increasing. However, women are 
entering in this kind of this jobs with a probability of 73%; for men it reaches the 30%. 
Declining jobs are declining for females (a decrease of 10 pp over the period), but the 
level stays the same as in the beginning of the period for men. Chances of being in high 
qualified occupations fall over the 17-year period. 
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The main difference with the Spanish case is that employment polarization is more 
noticeable than in Finland. In the southern country the increase in emerging low qualified 
and the drop in declining occupations are far more pronounced. 
Figure 19: Evolution of estimated probabilities for young workers with low educational 
level in Finland (1997-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
Finally, we analyze old workers with lower secondary level of education or less. 
The probability of working in low skilled jobs surges for women (reaching 60%) and 
stays below the 30% in the case of middle skilled occupations. Chances of being in high 
skilled jobs decrease and sits close to 10% in 2012. On the contrary, men are more likely 
to work in declining occupations in 2012 than in 1995. They face similar probabilities of 
being in emerging low qualified and emerging high qualified jobs. 
Old women with low education deal with the same evolution in Finland and in 
Spain. Nevertheless, men don’t face employment polarization in Finland as they do their 
Spanish counterparts. 
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Figure 20: Evolution of estimated probabilities for old workers with low educational 
level in Finland (1997-2012) 
 
The plot also includes 95% confidence intervals. Source: own work based on EU-LFS data. 
 
What we can see in the three role model countries is that technological changes 
are forcing the decline in medium paid occupations (substitute of machines) and the 
increase of top and low paid occupations (complementary or at least neutral to 
technological advances). The increase in emerging high qualified occupations affects 
positively both men and women, when their education is high. Men are the ones suffering 
from the decline in medium skilled jobs and women are the ones who get benefit from 
the rise in emerging low qualified occupations, which reflects the increasing female labor 
force participation. Finally, the evolution for old and young workers is quite similar if the 
attained educational level is the same. Nevertheless, young workers seem to be more 
exposed to low qualified jobs than old workers, even when they are high qualified.  
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8. Conclusions  
This master thesis studies the effect of technological progress on employment for 
16 advanced European economies for the period 1995-2012. In order to do so, we propose 
to follow a two-step analysis. Firstly, we perform a descriptive analysis and, then, an 
empirical one, using a multinomial logit model. 
On the one hand, the descriptive analysis consists on an examination of the 
changes in employment. Since we follow an occupational approach, we look at changes 
in the distribution of occupations. We rank six occupational categories according to 2002 
average wages and test whether employment polarization is happening in European 
countries. Effectively, we conclude that occupations in the lowest part and highest part 
of the wage distribution grew relative to the ones in the middle part. Those middle skilled 
jobs’ share on employment decreased over the period. However, we have distinguished 
two periods: the expansionary period (1995-2007) and the whole period including the 
recession period (1995-2012). In general terms, job polarization is seen for both year 
spans. Moreover, this phenomenon deepened during the recession years for all the 
countries (but Italy). 
Secondly, the main contribution of this master thesis is to stablish the relationship 
between the three challenges faced by advanced European: aging, closing the gender gap 
in the labor market participation and the uncertainty caused by technological progress. 
We estimated a multinomial model to calculate the probabilities of being in an emerging 
high qualified, declining or emerging low qualified occupational category depending on 
age, gender and education. The analysis is made for the whole 1995-2012 period, so we 
have estimated the model for each year in order to obtain changes in the probabilities of 
work in each category. However, we decided to broaden the classification used in the 
descriptive part. Still, we had to limit our analysis more because estimation the model for 
the 16 would produce a huge output. Three role models have been selected for the study 
based on the challenges discussed above. In concrete, Spain is a country with relatively 
low technology implementation (when compared to the leaders), a long-term aging 
problem and room for improvement in gender equality. The second country is Germany. 
It sits in the European mean level in the different measurement for technology, gender 
and aging. The last country is Finland, that is considered a leader. It is placed at top in 
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technological rankings, is the European country with the highest share of women in the 
labor market and does not face that big aging phenomenon. 
Employment polarization is seen when analyzing the probabilities of working in 
emerging and declining occupations. However, this pattern is more noticeable for the 
least advanced country (Spain). Men, mainly those with low educational level are exiting 
declining jobs to enter into low paid service and sales positions. Still, the increase in 
emerging low qualified occupations is absorbed by women (generally the low educated 
ones).  This mean that technological change is affecting negatively men (specially the 
low educated ones) and positively women. This way women have opportunities of 
keeping entering the labor market. This makes sense with what we have seen in the 
descriptive statistics. The 67% of workers in declining occupations (at European level) 
are men, so it is reasonable that the ones suffering the decline are males. The same 
happens to emerging low qualified occupations, where the 60% of workers are females. 
This way, women are benefitted from the shift in the labor market demand. Nevertheless, 
high educated women face a more noticeable mismatch because they are more exposed 
to low qualified jobs than men. Finally, there are no major differences between men and 
women in emerging high qualified occupations. 
Nevertheless, we observe country differences. In the case of a country with an 
aging phenomenon (Spain) there are differences between young and old workers with the 
same educational level. Older workers (aged 45 years or more) have higher probabilities 
of being in better jobs. Therefore, there is a “premium” for being old. It is also remarkable 
that young high qualified workers, have relatively high probability of being in low paid 
job. Particularly, women that have 30% likelihood of working in these positions. Young 
Spanish individuals seem to start at low skill jobs before aiming for better jobs. In general, 
the trend of the probabilities for high- and low-skilled occupations is upwards over the 
period, while the trend for the declining jobs is downwards. 
In Germany and Finland (countries where the aging phenomenon started before, 
and thus, with better predictions about aging) there is no mismatch for young workers 
with tertiary education. The evolution for old workers is similar for the three economies. 
We also can say that employment polarization is smoother. It is also seen, that high 
educated women are not likely to work in low paid occupations. In the case of Germany, 
the probabilities of being on a category depend entirely on education when comparing 
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people of the same gender. As regards Finland, differences are not as big as in Spain and 
the situation is closer to the one in Germany. 
This evidence reflects that in countries that are better prepared to face future 
challenges there is a better match between workers’ qualifications and occupations. 
However, it also gives rise to questions concerning public policy regarding what to do 
with workers exiting declining occupations and also about the high concentration of 
women in low paid jobs. As mentioned before, due to the impossibility of obtaining data 
for 2012 onwards, we leave the period 2012-2018 for further research, but we expect the 
results to be even more noticeable. 
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